腐败行为及其治理选择——基于前景理论的研究

Corruption and Measures for Anticorruption——A Study Based on Prospect Theory

提出一个应用前景理论研究腐败行为的分析架构,考察腐败行为的特征、治理手段及其效率。研究发现,对于存在非理性偏差的腐败行为,加大惩罚力度的效果取决于行为人所受处罚的相对风险规避度量,一定条件下存在"惩罚陷阱":加大惩处力度反而使行为人加大腐败投入,选择高风险的腐败行为,此时行为人存在极端的赌徒心态。一个弹性的惩罚制度等同于一个对腐败的边际惩罚递减的惩罚制度,会增加行为人的腐败价值预期,增强行为人逃避严惩的侥幸心理,加剧腐败行为蔓延。并且,弹性越大,行为人绝对风险规避度越小,腐败行为的收入预期越高,腐败蔓延的速度越快。高薪的激励效果则依赖于监督惩罚环境、薪酬支付体系与行为人的价值取向。对处于经济转型的发展中国家而言,经济发展不平衡,利益矛盾冲突加剧,强烈冲击人们的价值取向与行为规范,行为人不患寡而患不均,提高官员薪酬的激励手段难以取得好的反腐效果。优化监督执法环境与公务员的选才机制是治理腐败的有效手段。

The prospect theory is one of the two important pillars upon which the whole of behavioral decision theory rests. This article puts forward a method to studying corruption with prospect theory. In the article, we show that the increase in the severity of punishments will not always deter corrupt behavior because of offender's incomplete rationality. Whether the increasing punishment is effective or not depends on offender's Arrow-Pratt measure for relative risk aversion. Under certain conditions,there is a 'punishment trap' in which even if punishment is more severe,offender may be more likely to commit corruption when opportunities arise. It is also found that flexible regulations on punishments and lenient penalty can result in the anticipation of high benefit and low risk of corruption,encouraging the fluke mindedness and giving rise to the persistence and pervasiveness of corruption. Then it follows that an effective mechanism to contain corruption should include establishing a scientific system of personnel, optimizing the regulatory function and enhancing the enforcement of penalty.