摘要本文选择具有代表意义的37家沪市民营上市公司为样本,研究其经营绩效与高管持股比例之间的关系,得出沪市民营上市公司高管持股比例目前较低,经营绩效与高管持股比例呈倒 U 型的二次曲线关系,开始随高管持股比例的提高而增加,随后又随其持股比例的提高而下降的结论。最后提出相应对策:在有条件的民营上市公司逐步推广股票期权计划,加强对上市公司高管持股的监管力度,引导民营上市公司积极健康发展。
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