政府管制能解决商业银行的代理问题吗

Can Government Regulation Solve the Commercial Bank's Agency Problems?

商业银行既存在债权人与股东之间的债务代理问题,也存在外部股东与内部经营者之间的股权代理问题。由于商业银行特殊的资本结构,政府对商业银行实行金融管制,以便治理商业银行债务代理问题。而政府管制存在一个理论上的"边界"。在现实中,由于路径依赖,政府管制越过了这个边界,变成管制过剩,从而加重了商业银行的股权代理问题。

The agency problem not only exists between creditors and shareholders but also between external shareholders and internal operators. Due to the special capital structure of commercial banks, the government imposes financial control on commercial banks in order to regulate their debt agency, there is, however, a theoretical ＂hedge＂ in the government regulation. But in reality, due to the path dependence, the government regulation tends to surpass this hedge and becomes over-regulated and as a result aggravates the problem of equity agency of banks.