总经理报酬激励强度、董事会组成和公司价值内生互动——理论与实证研究

Interaction Relationship of Compensation Incentive Intensity of General Manager,the Constitution of Director Board and Corporate Value-Theoretical and Empirical Research

本文首先建立理论模型分析总经理报酬激励强度、董事会组成、公司价值之间的内生互动关系;选取了2001～2007年制造行业的上市公司为研究样本,通过设立联立方程组考察三者之间的互动关系,结果发现:(1)公司价值与总经理报酬激励强度之间存在显著正向互动关系; (2)内部董事比例对公司价值有显著正的影响,公司价值对内部董事比例无显著影响,公司价值与独立董事比例、董事会规模之间不存在互动关系;(3)总经理报酬激励强度与独立董事比例和董事会规模存在显著的正向互动关系,与内部董事比例不存在互动关系。根据检验结果,我们认为,独立董事制度成为经理自利的工具,需要从制度上增强其独立性,在董事会结构中增加内部董事的比例,强化董事会促进公司长期发展的治理导向作用。

Firstly, we construct a theoretical model to analyze the endogenous interactive relationship between compensation incentive intensity of general manager, the Constitution of Director Board and corporate value. Then, we select the listed manufacturing corporation in 2001 and 2007 as samples, and use simultaneous equations to examine the interaction relationship between them; The empirical results are： （1） there are significant positive interactive relationship between t corporate value and executive incentive intensity;（2） Corporate value have significant positive influence on the proportion of insider directors, but the proportion of insider directors have no significant influence on corporate value. Corporate value and the proportion of independent directors , the size of the board are not determined simultaneously; （3） executive incentive intensity and the proportion of independent directors ＆the size of the board are determined simultaneously. There are no significant interactive influence between executive incentive intensity and the proportion of insider directors. Based on those results, we propose that independent directors are become the facilitates for executive entrenchment, and its independent should be enhanced; in addition, we should increase the insider directors in the board, and strength the governance role of board oriented to the long-- term development of the corporate.