税收流失中的双委托-多代理问题

Multi-principal Multi-agent Problem in Tax Evasion

本文首次给出了税收流失问题中的多委托—多代理模型分析框架,并将政府、国税局和地税局、纳税人置于统一的博弈框架下,作为博弈的三方进行讨论。只要政府给国税局和地税局以适当的激励,政府仍然能设计出让纳税人"诚实"申报的显示机制;国税局和地税局作为税收征管者和纳税人之间的博弈可以看成是一个双委托—代理问题,此时税收征收上的"正外部性"和税收监菅上的"搭便车"效应将是双委托—代理问题中的新现象。

It is the first time to provides a framework for the analysis of multi-principal multi-agent model in the tax evasion,and to discuss the game relation of the government, the National Taxation Administration and the Local Taxation Bureau, the taxpayers under one unified game framework in this article. This paper shows that as long as the government gives proper incentive to the National Taxation Administration and the Local Taxation Bureau, it can still design the revelation mechanism to make the taxpayers report truthfully; the game relation between the National Taxation Administration and the Local Taxation as the tax monitors and the taxpayers can be viewed as a double-principal agent problem, then a positive externality from the tax collection and the effects of free riding in tax monitoring become the new phenomenon in the double-principal agent problem.