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市场失灵还是体制扭曲——重复建设形成机理研究中的争论、缺陷与新进展 被引量:173

Market Failure or Institutional Weaknesses——The Argument,Defect and New Development in Research of Redundant Construction Formation Mechanism
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摘要 在重复建设形成机理的研究中,以"市场失灵"来解释重复建设、产能过剩形成的研究思路占据相对主流的位置.政策部门则以这些理论为依据,始终将对投资和市场准入的行政管制作为"重复建设"治理政策的核心。本文重新审视遵循这一思路的主要研究文献.发现这些研究在理论上均存在根本性缺陷。进一步的研究表明.体制扭曲下地方政府不当干预微观经济的行为。通过成本外部化效应、投资补贴效应和风险外部化效应扭曲企业的投资行为,正是导致企业过度投资、产能过剩和行业重复建设的主要原因。本文的核心观点是。以行政性管制政策治理"重复建设"是不合适的。解决"重复建设"问题,需要在土地产权、金融体制、财政体制等方面进一步推进改革,发挥市场竞争对企业投资决策的影响。 In the research of redundant construction formation mechanism, the relatively mainstream research idea is formed by using "market failure" to explain redundant construction and overcapacity. Based on these theories, policy department will always take the administrative control about investment and market access as core of "redundant construction" governance polices. This paper re-examine the major research literatures followed this idea, and find that there are fundamental flaws in all these researches. Further research shows that local government improper interments micro economy in a distorted system conduct redundant construction, and it's the main reason. This improper intervention behavior distort enterprises' investment behavior mainly through cost external effects, investment subsidies effect and effect of external risks, then lead to over-investment on capacity and redundant construction in industry. These studies shows that it is improper to governance "redundant construction" by administrative control policy, and it is needed to further promote the reform in land property, financial system and so on in order to radical cure the "redundant construction".
出处 《中国工业经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第1期53-64,共12页 China Industrial Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金项目"中国投资领域中的重复建设问题:理论模型 实证分析与政策建议"(批准号7047309)。
关键词 重复建设 形成机理 市场失灵 体制扭曲 治理政策 redundant construction formation mechanism market failure distorted system governance policy
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