一个非结构化P2P网络中基于信誉的激励机制

A Reputation-Based Incentive Mechanism for Unstructured P2P Networks

在P2P网络中,freerider节点和恶意节点的不合作行为严重影响了P2P服务的可用性。为此,本文提出了一个应用于非结构化P2P环境下基于信誉的激励机制。该机制通过有限的信任信息的共享,实现信任评估和推荐信任度评估;并以此为基础,通过有效的拓扑构造和服务选择策略及服务请求冲突解析策略的选择,实现对合作节点的激励和对freerider和恶意节点的遏制及惩罚。分析及仿真实验表明,本文提出的基于信誉的激励机制是简单有效的。

In P2P （peer-to-peer） networks, the service availability is seriously affected by the misbehavior of selfish and malicious peers. So we propose a reputation-based incentive mechanism for unstructured P2P systems. By limited trust information sharing, we can evaluate the peer＇s service reliability and recommendation credibility. In order to reward the good behavior and penalize the bad, we first propose a reputation-based adaptive topology protocol, which takes account of the peer＇s rational belief of maintaining connections. Then, we select proper reputatiorrbased policies that determine the pairs of peers eligible to interact with each other. We introduce two different dimensions of reputation-based policies, namely ＂provider selection＂ and ＂contention resolution＂. The simulation and analyses show that the reputation-based incentive mechanism is simple yet effective in combating the misbehavior of selfish and malicious peers.