农业面源污染博弈分析及其控制对策研究

Games Theory Analysis and Control Strategies of Agricultural Non-point Source Pollution

运用博弈论对农业面源污染的外部性问题分析表明,农村公共环境物品的纳什均衡供给小于帕雷托最优供给,而且二者之间的差距随着参与人数的增加而扩大,目前难以依赖农户参与治理农业面源污染的途径。因此,为了实现社会主义新农村的发展目标,必须有效组织和安排防治农业面源污染的技术、管理和制度三个层面的复杂问题,采取相应的对策控制农业面源污染的恶化局面。

The analysis of external problems of agriculture non-point source pollution through game theory indicates that Nash Equilibrium supply of rural public environment goods is less than that of Pareto Optimal, and the gap will extend with the increase of participants. At present peasants＇ participation cannot be totally relied on to solve agriculture non-point source pollution. To reach development aims of socialism new country, we must establish and use techniques, management and rules to control agricuhure non-point source pollution.