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控股股东寻租条件及其价值衡量 被引量:3

Conditions for Rent-seeking by Controlling Shareholders and Metrics for Rent Value
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摘要 控股股东寻租是有条件的,通常当控股股东对经营预期低于寻租临界值时,控股股东就会寻租;当企业发展速度低于一定数值,控股股东可寻租额较大时,控股股东总会寻租。企业发展速度、控股股东股份和企业收益都会影响寻租临界值的大小。当存在控股股东寻租时,控股股东寻租的价值可以通过资本市场股权交易进行衡量,如采用市场收购控股权,控股股东寻租价值要高于其股份因收购而溢价的部分,如采用协议转让控股股份,控股股东寻租价值相等于控股股东股份的溢价部分。 Only under certain conditions would controlling shareholders seek rent. This occurs generally when their company's lifetime has passed the critical point of time they expect or, to be specific, when the speed of their company's development is lower than a certain level while they can obtain an attractive rent. The critical point of time is affected by the speed of company's development, shareholding structure and corporate revenue. When rent-seeking occurs, the price premium in a block trade of shares can be regarded as a rough measure for the value of rents controlling shareholder seek. For instance, the present value of rent will be above price premium in the case of tender offer, and will be equal to price premium in the ease of negotiated block.
作者 柏培文
出处 《管理评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第1期34-38,共5页 Management Review
基金 浙江省自然科学基金资助(Y607001)。
关键词 控股股东 寻租 临界值 controlling shareholder, rent-seeking, the critical point of time
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