逆向供应链的演化博弈研究

Research on Evolutionary Game of Reverse Supply Chain

本文研究了供应链中供应商企业关于实施逆向供应链(RSC)的演化博弈模型。考虑供应链中分别存在开放型与保守型两类供应商的决策情况,在市场机制下,只有当供应商实施RSC获得的额外收益大于0时,供应商才有积极性实施RSC;当供应商对RSC消极对待时,政府只有通过宏观调控:对不具有污染权的供应商采取惩罚机制迫使其实施RSC,而对具有污染权的供应商政府只能借助补偿机制诱导供应商实施RSC。最后,文章通过数值分析证明了结论的正确性。

This paper explores the evolutionary game model of RSC implemented by suppliers in the supply chain. The two kinds of decision, i.e. open and conservative, that suppliers usually make are analyzed separately. As a general rule of the market, only when the extra income derived from suppliers＂ implementation of RSC exceeds zero point, would they take the initiative. However, when suppliers are passive to RSC, the only effective solution is that the government takes macro-control measures, i.e., to force the suppliers without pollution rights to carry out RSC through a punishment mechanism, and to encourage the suppliers with pollution right to implement RSC through a compensation mechanism. Finally, the paper proves the correctness of its conclusion by numerical value analysis.