摘要
再贷款政策工具的定位仍然是困扰中国货币当局的关键问题之一。中国人民银行通过再贷款这一政策工具对清偿力不足的金融机构提供融资,实质就是"不良资产的货币化"。从现实来看,中国人民银行大规模地介入国有商业银行不良资产的处理,有可能危及中央银行的财务安全以及货币政策的信誉。但从最低限度分析,如果中央银行实施不良资产货币化的规模可与年新增现钞额相当的话,就不会危及中央银行和整个金融体系。
The position of the loans of the People's Bank of China is still an open question for the monetary authorities in China. In essence, it is considered as the monetization of bad loans as long as the People's Bank of China offered credits to the insolvent financial institutions. The paper discusses its bad effect and prospect on the central bank's finance to bad loans of the state-owned financial institutions. The monetization of bad loans may influence the financial security of the monetary authorities and the reputation of monetary policy in China. But from the analysis, the scale of monetization of bad loans of the People's bank of China equal to the new currencies in circulation at the least.
出处
《广东金融学院学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第1期35-45,128,共12页
Journal of Guangdong University of Finance
关键词
中央银行再贷款
不良贷款
货币化
central bank relending
non-performing loan
monetization minimum could be