人力资本参与公司治理--基于代理成本的分析框架

Participation of Human Capital in Corporate Goverance:An Agency-Cost Based Analysis

在信息不对称和静态条件下,不完备的企业契约往往把企业所有权配置给物力资本所有者。随着企业内部知识创建、积累,企业专用性人力资本的形成,人力资本可能受到企业物力资本,尤其是企业所有者机会主义行为的侵占,从而减少对于企业专用性人力资本的投资,因而产生有别于常说的所有者和管理者之间的特殊的代理成本。正因如此,作为降低此类代理成本的有效措施,人力资本应该参与公司治理。

In an incomplete contract ownership has often been given to physical capital. In fact the firm may own some resource and borrow some, the human resource may be taken as borrowed, which leads to the owner＇s opportunism to take away the rent from the accumulation of firm-specific knowledge and/or human capital. This is a different agency cost. Human capital should anticipate corporate governance.