资本结构突变的制度动力学模型探讨

On the Institutional Dynamics of Capital Structure Mutation

现代资本结构理论缺乏企业资本结构动态调整的制度动力学模型。本文利用新制度经济学的基本理论,研究了相关制度对重新谈判和股票发行时企业资本结构突变的影响,得出的结论是银行监管制度和债权人保护制度的变化,通过银行的债务豁免区的范围和位置而影响处于财务困境中的企业的资本结构被动调整;股票发行制度和股东权利保护制度的变化,通过发行人信号组合的选择而影响利用投资机会的企业的资本结构的主动调整。

Modern capital structure theories ignore the dynamic institution model of capital structure adjustment. As an important component element, we study the effect of relevant institutions on capital structure mutation in the course of renegotiation and stock issuing. Our conclusions are ： （ 1 ） changes of bank regulation and creditor protection induce the mutation of capital structure though the range and position of debt remission when the corporation is in a financial difficulty, （2） changes of stock issuing institution and shareholder protection induce the mutation of capital structure though the issuer＇s signal selection between debt and reserved stock.