地级市市长对于预算内教育经费支出的影响

The Recentralization of the Central-provincial Fiscal Relation and the Implementation of the Education Equalization in China(1994-2001)

论文运用2006年全国地级市的数据,对影响地级市预算内教育经费支出水平的因素进行了探索性研究。定量分析表明,地方财政自给度能够系统性地影响一个地级市的教育支出水平,但其影响模式并不是一种线性关系,尽管综合性的数据表明较高的自给度会导致较低教育支出比重。更为重要的是,多元回归分析的结论确认了地级市市长对于教育支出水平的显著性影响,而且,其影响方式与官僚制理论、人力资本理论的解释逻辑相一致。这一发现为已有研究的理论结论提供了强有力的经验支持,加深了人们对于"领导人影响政府财政预算"之模式的理解。

This article explores the influence of the mayors of prefectural cities on their educational spending in 2006.Empirical evidence suggests the fiscal autonomy a city enjoys has a systematic but non-linear effect on its education spending pattern,although aggregate data support the claim that the higher degree of fiscal autonomy the higher the expenditure on education.More importantly,regression models support that the mayors exert substantially significant impacts on education spending and the pattern of such influence is consistent with the logic of Down's theory of bureaucracy and the theories of human capital.It is argued that these findings would further our understanding on how political leaders impact over budgeting process.