我国耕地资源安全保障主体的行为倾向与博弈关系

The Behavior Tendency and Game Relation About Protectors of Cultivated Land Resource Security in China

耕地资源安全是耕地保护的上升形式,从耕地资源安全的高度探讨其保障主体行为对于找出当前耕地保护政策失效原因具有重要的意义。文章从耕地资源安全的概念和保障主体分类入手,分析了各保障主体的行为倾向和博弈关系。研究结果表明,我国耕地资源安全保障主体主要包括中央政府、地方政府和农民,在耕地资源数量安全保障方面,中央政府的积极性强于农民,农民的积极性又要强于地方政府;在耕地资源质量和生态安全保障方面,各保障主体的保障积极性都要弱于数量安全,但中央政府的保障积极性仍最高,地方政府和农民均消极应对;各保障主体的行为倾向和博弈关系在一定程度上偏离了耕地资源安全保障政策的总体目标,而从法律上明确保障主体的权利、义务及其行为约束制度有助于规范我国耕地资源安全保障主体的行为。

Cultivated land resource security is the farther form of cultivated land protection. So it is of important significance for seeking the reason of inefficient protective policy of current cultivated land through discussing the behavior of protectors based on cultivated land resource security. The article discusses the concept of cultivated land resource security and classification of protectors firstly, then analyses protectors＇ behavior tendency and their game relation. The results indicates that the protectors include central government, local government and farmer. In the aspect of cultivated land resource quantity security safeguard, the positivity of central government is stronger than that of farmer, the positivity of farmer is stwnger than that of local government. In the aspect of cultivated land resource quality and ecological security safeguard, the positivity of every protector is weaker than that of quantity security. But the positivity of central government is the strongest of the protectors. Local government and farmer deal with it negatively. The behavior tendency and game relation of protectors deviate the general target of cultivated land resource security in a certain extent. It helps to rectify the behavior of protectors through constituting right, obligation and administrant system of protectors based on law.