二元金融体制与农户消费信贷选择——对合会的解释与分析

Dual Financial Institution and Farmers' Choice on Consumer Credit Behavior:The Explanation and Analysis of ROSCA

正规金融失灵为非正规金融的产生和发展提供了制度基础,两者并存的二元化结构是我国农村金融体制的主要特征。本文在Besley模型的基础上引入农户收入不确定性和流动性约束等假设条件,以我国南方农村广泛存在的轮会(合会的一种形式)为例,分析了农户收入不确定的情况下民间合作性金融组织在减少农户为得到耐用消费品的等待时间,扩大当期消费,缓解流动性约束,提高效用水平方面的优势;分析了轮会的违约风险以及相比正规金融的独特优势,得出了轮会和正规金融机构共存时农户消费信贷行为选择的边界。最后,在结论性评述的基础上,本文给出了相关政策建议。

Formal financial failure supplies the generation and development of non-formal financial with institutional basis. And the coexistent dual system is the main feature of rural financial system in China. This paper introduces assumptions such as famers income uncertainty and liquidity constraint on the basis of Besley Model, and takes example for Lunhui, a kind of Rotating Savings and Credit Association （ROSCA）, which generally existed in south rural area. This paper analyses the superiority of civil cooperative financial institutions in terms of reducing waiting time of farmers for consumer durables, expanding current consumption, relieving liquidity constraint and raising utility level under the circumstances of famer＇s income uncertainty. And this paper analyses the default risk of Lunhui and unique advantages compared with formal financial, draws the conclusion of choice boundary of consumer credit behavior under the coexistence of Lunhui and formal financial. In the end, on the basis of conclusive comments, we gave relevant suggestions.