集体行动的困境:理论阐释和实证分析——以Q市水费缴纳行为为例

The dilemma of collective action:a theoretical illustration and empirical analysis

依据奥尔森的"搭便车"理论和集体行动困境的理论模型对Q市一居民小区的水费缴纳行为调查研究表明:集体行动的形成取决于成员之间存在共同利益,并依赖于组织中公认权威的号召与带领;集体行动困境的最终解决需要领导权威将成员的共同利益转化为一致的利益偏好和行动取向,从而消除成员的"搭便车"心理,采取一致行动。

The investigation of the water charge in Q-city in Residential Region shows that the forming of collective action depended on the common benefits between the remembers. The forming of collective action relies on the public authority＇s call and leading, and further eliminated the members free-rider psychology. The final solution of the collective action dilemma needs the leading authority makes the common interests into consistent interests prejudice and action orientation, then takes the same action.