因果机制与定律说明

Causal/Mechanical and Lawful Explanation

萨尔蒙提出科学说明是要提供"因果机制"。在他看来,因果性是优先的,有了因果才有说明,而且他认为有些因果是可以不需要定律的,所以因果也比定律更为基本。本文试图从四个方面对萨尔蒙的观点进行反驳:(1)萨尔蒙用"记号传递"作为区分因果过程和虚假过程的条件,可能绕不开因果概念,会有循环定义的问题。(2)萨尔蒙承认单一因果,但是单一因果只有在我们对科学定律有所认识才能予以辨别。(3)因果性可以表达为定律形式,但是并不是所有的定律都可以表达为因果,例如量子力学中的全同粒子的关联可以表现为定律形式,但两者之间并没超距的因果作用。(4)萨尔蒙认为科学说明应该是本体论,但是科学说明作为人的活动应该是认识论。即便从本体论可能是萨尔蒙所谓"从下至上式",但是从认识论上,科学说明应该是"从上至下式"。

Wesley proposed causal/mechanical account for scientific explanation. He thinks causation is prior to explanation, and some causations may he not lawful, therefore causation prior to laws as well. The paper tries to tackle Salmon＇s account from four aspects： （1） Salmon uses ＂mark transmission＂ as the criterion distinguishing causal processes from pseudo processes. However, it could not avoid the concept of causation, therefore will meet the problem of circularity. （2） Salmon acknowledges singular causation. But we have to identify causation by scientific laws. （3） Causality could be express in term of laws, while not all laws are causal. For example, we could lawfully express the remote correlation between identical particles in quantum mechanics, though there is no causation-at-a-distance. （4） Although Salmon regards scientific explanation as ontic conception, as a kind of human practice, it should be epistemie. Even if ontologically Salmon＇s bottom-up approach is right, epistemologically, scientific explanation should be top-down.