摘要
主要研究在同一投资主体控制下的国有寡头垄断企业的竞争机制问题,作者不仅仅局限于对垄断企业的研究,更将问题进一步扩展至投资主体——对国资委的研究,文章将投资主体作为一个要求利润最大化的股东,研究如何实现投资主体与垄断企业之间的"双赢".本文主要应用斯坦克尔伯格均衡模型进行分析,并且采用实证检验的方法验证模型的正确性,最后对管理者给出了有针对性的建议,即应适当控制寡头垄断企业中领导者的市场份额,以使得投资主体与垄断企业均处于利润增长的区间,从而实现二者的双赢.
This article focuses on the competitive mechanism of the sate-owned monopoly enterprises which are under the same investment equity. The authors are not only confined to the study of the monopoly enterprises, but also enlarge the problem to the study of the investing equity- SASAC (State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission). The investing equity is treated as a stakeholder which requires maximum profit in this article. Thus our aim is to realize the "win-win" between the investing equity and the monopoly enterprises. The Stackelberg model is applied in this article. And the positive test is employed to validate the correctness of the model established in the article. Finally, a constructive suggestion is made to the managers, namely, by properly controlling the market share of leader of the oligopoly enterprises, the profit of both the investing equity and the monopoly enterprises will be all in the growing zone, and thus the win-win goal will be achieved.
出处
《河北工业大学学报》
CAS
北大核心
2009年第1期31-35,共5页
Journal of Hebei University of Technology
关键词
寡头垄断竞争
合谋
过度竞争
库诺特均衡
斯坦克尔伯格均衡
oligopolistic competition
collusion
excessive competition
coumot equilibrium
Stackelberg equilibrium