考虑利他主义的古诺模型研究

A Study on the Cournot Model with Altruism

针对完全利己和(或)完全利他可能不具有集体帕累托效率这些经济现象,利用文献[1]建立的GR博弈模型和GR均衡,建立了基于GR(黄金规则)的古诺模型,研究了GR均衡的集体帕累托效率性质与GR博弈中权重系统(描述厂商关心自己和他人的程度)之间的关系。结果表明,(1)对于N-厂商的情形,GR均衡集合与具有集体帕累托效率的策略组合构成的集合一致的充分必要条件是每个厂商都均等地关心自己和他人的利润;(2)对于两厂商的情形,GR均衡都具有集体帕累托效率的充分必要条件是,存在一个厂商均等地关心自己和他人的利润。这些结果一方面在古诺竞争的背景下加强了文献[1]的结果;另一方面表明。一个"平等地看待竞争对手利益"的古诺竞争将会获得集体有效率的竞争均衡。

Focusing on the economic phenomena where perfect self--interest and/or perfect altruism may not lead to collective Pareto efficiency, this paper makes use of the GR game model and the GR equilibrium in Reference [1], builds a Cournot model based on the GR （golden rule） and explores the relationship between the collective Pareto efficiency of GR equilibriums and the weight systems （to characterize the degrees to which a firm take into account other firms）. The results show that （1） in an N--firm Cournot model, the set of GR equilibriums is consistent with the set of strategy profiles with the collective Pareto efficiency if and only if all players attach the same weights to the profits of all players （including himself）, and （2） in the two--firm context, a GR equilibrium has the collective Pareto efficiency if and only if there is （at least） one player who equally treats his own and his opponent＇s profts. These results enforce those in Reference [1] under Cournot competition, on the other hand, they imply that Cournot competition where each firm equally treats its own and his opponent＇s profits will results in an equilibrium with collective efficiency.