国有住宅用地“双限”拍卖的竞价博弈模型

Competitive Bidding in Urban Land Auctions with Incentive Contracts

本文把国有住宅用地的"双限"拍卖构造成不完全信息竞价博弈模型,把房地产开发企业的资金机会成本和资金效率作为企业的类型。在一般效用函数形式下,本文求解了这个博弈的Bayesian Nash均衡。在均衡条件下,竞价企业的策略是企业类型参数的单调函数。

This paper formulates a game model of urban land auctions with incentive contracts seeking to keep house prices under control. I treat investment cost and efficiency as firm types, and assume utility functions of participants take general forms. This paper shows that in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium firm strategies are monotonic in firm types.