摘要
国有资本市场退出过程涉及的利益相关者有政府、银行、国有资本产权潜在接受方、国有资本的经营管理者和国有企业的职工等。这些利益主体对国有资本市场退出既可能合作也可能非合作,不同的结果会导致国有资本能否顺利有效退出。所以,各利益主体会围绕各自在国有资本市场退出过程中的利益得失进行充分地博弈。在博弈的过程中就形成了国有资本市场退出最优的效率条件,这些效率条件只有在以职工权益为核心所建立的一整套国有资本市场退出机制中才能发挥作用。
State-owned capital market withdrawal process involves the stakeholders such as the government, the bank, the state -owned capital property right latent receiver, lhe operator and manager of state-owned capital , the state-owned enterprise's staff and so on. These benefit main bodies possibly cooperate to the state-owned capital market withdrawal , also the possible non - cooperation, which can cause the state-owned capital withdraw smoothly and effectively or not. Therefore, all interest subjects will fully play games around each interests gain and loss while the state-run capital market withdrawal, various benefits host experience revolves respectively to carry on in the state-owned capital market withdrawal process benefit success and failure fully gambles. During the process of playing games, the opti- mum efficiency condition of the state-owned capital market withdrawal is formed. It can play role only in an entire set of state-owned capital market withdrawal mechanism established by regarding the staff rights and interests as the core.
出处
《华东经济管理》
CSSCI
2009年第2期77-80,154,共5页
East China Economic Management
基金
2007年广东商学院人文社会科学研究项目"WTO与国有控股公司改革的思考"(07YB09)
关键词
国有资本
利益相关者
博弈
state-owned capital
stakeholders
game