技术创新投资决策的不对称双头垄断期权博弈分析被引量：2

Technological Innovation Investment Option-game Equilibrium Strategy Analysis under an Asymmetric Duopoly

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摘要文章运用不对称双头垄断期权博弈模型,研究了需求不对称的两个企业在不确定条件下的研发投资决策。研究表明,需求比较优势的大小对企业均衡策略有显著影响,存在三类均衡:抢先均衡、序列均衡和同时投资均衡。均衡的类型取决于企业作为追随者、领先者和同时投资者的相对收益,而需求不对称程度是影响企业收益的重要因素。研究发现,当需求的不对称程度较低时存在明显的先动优势,从而导致抢先均衡;当需求的不对称程度足够大时,低需求冲击的企业没有动力成为领先者,从而产生序列投资均衡,当初始市场冲击大于低需求冲击企业的追随者策略投资临界时,将产生同时投资策略均衡。 This paper examines the equilibrium strategy of asymmetric duopoly real option model consisting of two firms with asymmetric demand functions. It finds that different level of comparative advantage will result in different equilibrium game strategies. If one firm has great comparative advantage, then it faces no preemptive competition by the other, while if the comparative advantage is small, the disad- vantageous firm can still exert preemptive competition over the advantageous firm. It also finds that the different initial economic shock will also result in sequential investment, simultaneous investment and preemptive investment.

作者曹国华谢忠黄薇

机构地区重庆大学经济与工商管理学院

出处《华东经济管理》 CSSCI 2009年第2期137-141,共5页 East China Economic Management

基金教育部新世纪优秀人才项目(NCET-07-0905) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70571089)

关键词技术创新双寡头博弈实物期权需求不对称 technological innovation duopoly game real options asymmetric demands

分类号 F124.3 [经济管理—世界经济]

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参考文献16

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