农村本地非回流劳动力转移研究——一个基于政府与农民的博弈分析

An Analysis on the Transfer of Native Non-return Rural Labor Force——Based on a Game Theory Analysis between the Government and the Peasant

鉴于我国的制度变迁具有强烈的政府主导色彩,破除农村剩余劳动力转移中的各种制度性障碍,离不开政府的作用。文章从政府的角度将政府和本地非回流劳动力作博弈分析。通过博弈模型以及进一步分析发现,政府和本地非回流劳动力之间的博弈虽然在同时行动的情况下能实现唯一的纳什均衡,但由于本地转移劳动力回流的成本较小,政府要通过调研来观察本地转移劳动力非回流的概率,通过比较这个概率和计算得出的临界概率RG2-CG3-R'G1+CG2-CG1/RG1+RG2-R'G1-R'G2之间的关系来选择适当的政策搭配,从而促使本地转移劳动力的非回流。

Because of system variance in china has the color of government leading, so exploding the system impediment in rural surplus labor force transfer without the helps of government. This article looks the government and the outward non-return rural surplus labor force as two sides of the game matrix from the view of government. In the game of the government and native non-return rural surplus labor force, it can achieve the only result of Nash equilibrium in the case of the two side action at the same time. But because the costs of native rural surplus labor force circumfluence are very low, the government should calculates the probability of the non-return of native rural surplus labor force by researching material. After compared the probability and the critical probability, the government can choose the appropriate policy mix to promote the non-return of native rural surplus labor force.