基于博弈论的供应链价格与质量决策问题研究

Decision-making Problem of Price and Quality in the Supply Chain Based on Game Theory

文章建立了一个由单制造商与单零售商组成的两级供应链模型。在完全信息静态博弈、完全信息动态博弈与供应链协同合作三种情况下,分析了供应链的价格-质量均衡。研究发现,在非合作博弈下,制造商与零售商更倾向于完全信息动态博弈;在协同合作情况下,供应链能取得比非合作情况下更大的利润。文章使用Rubinstein讨价还价模型对增加的利润进行了分配。

A model with one manufacturer and one wholesaler is proposed. The price and quality level equilibriums of the decentralized supply chain with static game and dynamic game of complete information are analyzed. Its found that in the dentralized supply chain, dynamic game with complete information is preferred. In the centralized case, the optimal profit is greater than in the decentralized case. The existence of the distribution scheme is proved and the surplus profit of the supply chain is distributed by Rubinstein＇s Bargaining model.