摘要
论文从高指标、高压出发,分析了20世纪50年代末到60年代初的"大跃进"与困难时期的官员造假基础,指出指标考核让造假成为官场的一种游戏规则,趋利避害是官员的正常行为。论文分析了几类造假动机和几种官员的造假,最后指出指标考核弊病的危害。
High indices, coupled with high pressure, drove officials into systematic forgery in the "Big Leap Forward" movement and the subsequent great famine from late 1950s to early 1960s. To assess officials by indexfulfillment was a practice that resulted in exaggerated reports and fake statistics. This paper tries to reveal the motives behind the massive forgery in officialdom in that period and explain why assessment by index-fulfillment often does more harm than good.
出处
《开放时代》
CSSCI
2009年第3期84-96,共13页
Open Times