椭圆曲线密码VLSI实现的定时攻击与防护

Timing Attacking and Counteracting on VLSI Implementation of Elliptic Curve Cryptography

针对一种基于特征GF(2m)域的椭圆曲线密码(ECC)VLSI实现进行定时攻击分析,结果表明采用DA(Double Add)算法的ECC实现,可能泄漏密钥的汉明重量和其他电路秘密信息.在此基础上,利用统计分析提出一种引入随机延时来掩蔽时间特征的防护方法.攻击试验结果表明,该方法能够以4个有限域模乘运算模块的代价有效地增强ECC实现的抗定时攻击性.

This paper describes a timing attack against a VLSI implementation of elliptic curve cryptography （ECC） over GF （2^m）. The algorithm of DA （Double Add） used for the scalar multiplication of ECC, is vulnerable to timing attack, and it reveals an amount of information such as the hamming weight of the key and other secrecies. By statistical analyses, a protected implementation by random masking timing characteristics is presented. The attacking results show ,that the implementation can enhance the security of the cryptosystem at the cost of 4 modular multipliers.