我国电子制造业应对EPR的政府监管机制研究

Study on Chinese Electron Manufacturing Industry Implementing EPR under Government Supervision

在我国,由于目前实施"制造商延伸责任制"(EPR)成本的高昂,使得大多数可以利用公共资源的电子制造商不愿意实施EPR。本文首先构造了市场机制下,电子制造商间的静态博弈模型;接着构造了政府规制下,电子制造商实施"制造商延伸责任制"的演化博弈模型。分析指出:在我国,要促使电子制造商回收处理废旧品,必须借助政府的宏观调控措施,要求政府采取适度的惩罚力度和保持一定的监督概率。当然,随着实施"制造商延伸责任制"成本的减少,实现电子制造业的责任延伸制的进程会越来越快。文章最后采用数值算例证明了文中结论的正确性。

In China, because the cost of putting EPR into practice is very high, most of electronic manufacturers who may use the poblic resource would not implement EPR. Firstly, this paper constructs the static gambling model between electronic manufacturers. Then, the paper constructs evolutionary game model about how electronic manufacturers implement it under government regulation. The analytic results points out, in our country, to enable electronics manufacturers recycling waste materials, it is necessary to rely on the government＇s macrocontrol measures, ask government to inflict an appropriate punishment and maintain a certain probability supervision. Of course, with the cost implementing the＂ extended manufacturer responsibility＂ reduced, the process will become ever faster to achieve a manufacturing extension responsibility. The article finally proves the correctness of the conclusions with a numerical example.