自由裁量论研究——以德沃金自然法学和包容性实证主义法学中的自由裁量论为视角

On the Discretion Thesis:From the Perspective of Dworkin's Natural Law and Inclusive Legal Positivism

在法官造法意义上的"自由裁量论"争论中,德沃金认为司法过程实际是法官们在法律规定的幅度内依法行使自由裁量践行裁判,反对法官造法意义上的"自由裁量论"。所有的法律实证主义者都同意法官造法意义上的"自由裁量论",基于对法律效力的渊源类判准和内容类判准的不同理论主张,包容性实证主义法学与排他性实证主义法学在此种"自由裁量论"适用空间上也存在着极大差异,渊源类判准及内容类判准适用后法官的"自由裁量权"的不同适用空间也是包容性与排他性实证主义法学的理论分野所在。

In the controversies about ＂discretion＂ in the sense of judge＇s law- making, Professor Dworkin regards that the judicial process is actually the practice of discretion in the scope of the law by the judges, and he opposes ＂discretion＂ in the sense of judge＇s law - making. All the positivists of law agree on ＂discretion＂ in the sense of judges law - making. Base on the different opinions between pedigree criteria and content criteria, different viewpoints on the fields in which ＂ discretion＂ can be used become a significant dividing line of theory between inclusive and exclusive legal positivism.