期刊文献+

我国企业年金期权式管理费设计主张的效用分析 被引量:2

Utility Analysis of Design View on Option-type Structure of Management Fee of Enterprise Pension in China
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摘要 我国企业年金投资管理费制度是激励和约束投资管理人的重要因素。文章提出和设计了含有特定控制因素的期权式管理费制度,认为这种管理费制度可以使投资管理人和计划受益人的目标相一致,有利于敦促投资管理人自发控制年金基金的投资风险,并在此基础上提高年金基金的收益。这种期权式管理费制度设计,对于我国企业年金的健康发展具有重要意义。 The management fee system of enterprise pension investment is the important factor that inspires and restains invstment managers. This paper establishes option-type fee system with certain controlling factors. It considers that this type of fee system can make goal congruence between investment managers and planned beneficiaries and restrict managers on automatically controlling investment risk of pension funds, leading to an increase of pension fund income. This design view on option-type structure of management fee is helpful to the development of enterprise pension funds in China.
作者 史丹丹 李曜
出处 《财经研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第3期27-37,共11页 Journal of Finance and Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(70573067)
关键词 企业年金基金 投资管理费 期权式管理费结构 enterprise pension fund management fee on investment option-type structure of management fee
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参考文献13

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共引文献24

同被引文献11

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