摘要
文章基于锦标赛模型分析了组织中扶弱抑强的歧视性资源配置现象。模型表明,若互相竞争的代理人能力不对称,则扶弱抑强的歧视性资源配置政策将降低刺激代理人努力的竞赛奖金(即激励成本),因而有利于委托人。模型还表明,强者与弱者的能力差距必须在一定范围内,委托人才能通过竞赛激励合约得到好处;并且委托人倾向在代理人能力相差不大时减少代理人生产风险,而在代理人能力相差悬殊时选择增加代理人生产风险,即通过操纵代理人的"运气"来促进代理人的竞争。文章分析也有助于思考广泛存在的各种扶弱抑强的社会现象。
Based on a tournament model, this paper analyzes the resource allocation discrimination phenomenon of supporting the weak and restraining the powerful （SWRP）. The model shows that, SWRP policy is beneficial for the principal when the agents have asymmetry capability. The principal can benefit from tournament incentive contract only when the capability difference between the weak and the powerful is limited in a certain degree, and they can promote the competition between the weak and the powerful by manipulating the agents＇ chances. The analysis is also helpful for us to understand other SWRP phenomena in society.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第3期68-79,共12页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
广东省人文社科重点研究基地重大项目资助(06ZDXM790008)
关键词
歧视
锦标赛
扶弱抑强
激励合约
经济组织
discrimination
tournament model
supporting the weak and restraining the powerful
incentive contract
economic organization
