摘要
由于战争的高成本,理性的国家本应通过战前的讨价还价达成一个反映战后结果的和平协议,从成本收益的角度看,它既可以避免战争的成本,又可以获得战后的收益,因此,和平谈判优于战争。但为什么理性的国家却选择高成本的战争方案呢?对战争的理性主义解释必须回答这一困惑。基于此,战争的讨价还价理论认为信息不对称、承诺问题、问题的不可分割性导致国家无法在战前达成和平协议从而理性地选择战争手段。该理论为战争研究做出了突出的贡献,但自身也存在某些理论和经验上的缺失。
Since war is costly,rational states should make ex ant(prewar)bargains that reflect ex post(postwar)outcome.In the perspective of cost-gain calculation,negotiated settlements not only avoid high costs of war,but also obtain postwar gains.Therefore,peaceful negotiation is better than war.But why do rational states actually choose to fight The explanations for war must answer this puzzle.To resolve this puzzle,bargaining theory of war argues that information asymmetry,commitment problems,and issue indivisibilities prevent states from striking bargains,and compel rational states to wage wars.This theory makes prominent contributions to the study of war.However,the theory has some theoretical and empirical limitations.
出处
《世界经济与政治》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第2期13-23,共11页
World Economics and Politics