人大预算决策、机会主义行为与宪法性约束

NPC's Budget Decision-making,Opportunistic Behavior and Constitutional Constraint

与行政部门一样,立法机构在预算决策过程中同样存在着机会主义行为。本文从抑制公共支出总量膨胀与防止公共支出结构异化这两个角度,就如何施加宪法性约束以限制人大在预算决策过程中的机会主义行为做出了理论的探讨。问题的研究对于目前正在进行的《预算法》的修订和完善具有重要的参考价值。

Resembling executive branches, the legislative organizations have incentives to take opportunistic behaviors in the process of budget decision-making. From the perspec- tives of the prevention of total expansion of public expenditure and alienation of public ex- penditure structure, this paper has made a theoretical discussion about constitutional con- straints on these opportunistic behaviors in the process of budget decision-making by NPC. This study can be taken as an important reference to the amendment and perfection of Budget Law.