薪酬制度考虑外部监管了吗--来自中国上市公司的证据

Do Compensational Schemes Consider External Monitoring?Evidence from Chinese Listed-firms

本文以中国的上市公司为样本,考察了高管薪酬契约与外部监管的关系,结果发现,外部监管对高管薪酬有显著的影响,但与最优契约论不完全相符。研究发现,高管薪酬与第一大股东持股比例负相关;由于所有者虚位,国有企业的高管薪酬敏感性较高;由于远离管理者,外资控股的公司高管薪酬敏感性较高;独立董事占董事会总人数的比重与高管薪酬正相关而与薪酬敏感性负相关;较高的银行借款/总资产比率对高管薪酬有抑制作用;处于垄断地位的管制行业高管薪酬敏感性较高;高管持股对薪酬的敏感性不影响。最后,在控制了外部监管因素对薪酬敏感性的影响后,高管薪酬与公司下年度的业绩增长显著正相关,表明上市公司的高管薪酬制度基本上具备了激励机制。

When minimizing total contracting costs, monitoring costs and bonding costs substitute at the margin. Compensation sensitivity to firm performance is a bonding cost, which suggests that compensation sensitivity to performance should decline as monitoring increases. In this paper, we examine top-managerial compensation and its sensitivity to firm performance and external monitoring in Chinese listed-firms, and find that there is a negative relationship between top-managerial compensation and the share held by the biggest shareholder. We also find that, because of the absence of principal or distance from management, there is a stronger executive pay-performance link in listed firms owed by the state or foreigners. Moreover, we also find that in companies which have more independent directors on the board, top-managers get higher basic pay and lower risk performance-related pay, and that a high bank or bond debt rate restrains top-managerial basic pay and promotes risklinked pay. Top-managers in monopoly industries have higher compensation sensitivity; implying these managers get more abnormal return via high earnings allocation. Empirical results presented here indicate that external monitoring by controlling shareholders directly decreases the use of pay-for-performance contracting, which is consistent with the theory of agency cost-based contracting. However, indirect monitoring by state owners, foreigners or creditors such as banks or bond holders results in higher compensation sensitivity, which is inconsistent with agency cost-based contracting. In addition, more outside directors result in higher basic pay and lower risk performance-related pay, which is consistent with the managerial power approach. We also find that there is a positive relationship between top-managerial compensation and an increase in company performance; implying that an incentive effect exists in the system of top-managerial compensation in Chinese listed-firms. These results suggest that CEO compensation is part of a package of behavior controls and managerial power, and are, in general, responsive to firm performance.