经理声誉考虑、任务关联性和长期报酬激励的效果研究

Incentive Effects of Long-term Compensation When Managers are Concerned about Reputation and Undertake Multiple Tasks

为研究如何激励经理努力提高企业未来业绩,假设经理承担着两项任务:声誉激励其提高企业当前业绩,报酬激励其提高未来业绩;在多任务委托代理模型框架下,本文研究了声誉和长期报酬对经理提高未来业绩的激励效果。本文把企业业绩分为当期业绩和长期(即未来)业绩,并假设委托人目标是长期企业业绩最大化,而不是当期业绩最大化。同时本文对经理努力成本函数的假设有重大改进:给出了经理长期和短期努力的具体的成本函数形式,考虑了两种任务即努力间的关联性情况,假设长期努力和当期努力有不同的成本系数。目前相关模型的成本函数最多只能满足以上三个条件中的前两个。因此,运用本文多任务委托代理模型分析得出的结论更明确、直观,并且更符合实际。本文发现,经理不同努力的成本、两项任务之间的关联性对经理的努力行为选择有重要的影响,要激励经理提高企业长期业绩,应该减少经理长期努力的成本或者弱化当期激励。

It can be detrimental to shareholders if corporate managers are only concerned with current or short-term firm performance and overlook long-term performance. It is important that managers be motivated to enhance not only current firm performance but also long-run performance. However, few papers on executive remunera- tion distinguish between current and long-run firm performance when they model managerial compensation incentives. In order to study the different incentive effects of compensation and managerial reputation on long-term firm performance, this paper extended the traditional principle-agent model by assuming that the objective is to maximize the long-term firm performance in addition to shortterm or current firm performance. Therefore, this paper assumes the manager performs two tasks： one is to enhance current firm performance which is motivated by his reputation considerations; the other is to enhance long-term performance which is motivated by long-term compensation. Under an improved multiple task principal-agent model, this paper analyzes the different incentive effects of long-term compensation, （i.e. managerial compensation linked to long-term firm performance）, and managerial reputation considerations. Our multi-task model is distinguished from previous multi-task models in that it not only gives the specific function forms of both long-term and short-term effort cost, but also assumes the two different cost functions have different cost coefficients and are correlated with each other. Most current multi-task principleagent models only assume at most two of these conditions, usually the first and the third conditions, hold at the same time. Therefore, our model can give more straightforward, practical and meaningful results. We find that managerial effort selection is affected by the relationship between the two effort costs and their respective cost coefficients, and that the manager＇s long-term effort costs should be reduced or current effort incentives be weakened to motivate him to improve long-term firm performance.