竞争、外部效应与专利权人技术许可行为的扭曲

Competition,Externality and Distorted Licensing Behavior

在一般性假设下通过构建专利技术的使用许可证的拍卖模型,运用机制设计方法分析了专利权人面临竞争性产业时的最优技术许可策略,进而从创新知识传播或反垄断的角度考察了其许可行为的扭曲。技术许可的结果会对产业中的部分生产者施加负外部效应,这导致其购买专利的动机发生改变,并由此影响了专利权人的许可行为。研究结果表明,在最优的许可机制中,外部效应的存在使得专利权人能够以入门费的形式从未被许可的生产者攫取租金;另一方面也导致其许可证的保留价格过高而导致了知识的低效传播。

By developing an auction model of licenses under some general assumptions,this paper applies tools of mechanism design to analyzing licensing strategies of a patent holder facing a competitive industry.Thus the distortion of its licensing behavior is investigated from the viewpoint of dissemination of innovation knowledge or antitrust.The result of licensing to a competitive ind-ustry may impose producers on negative externalities,which changes their motives of buying patent,hence patent holders＇ licensing behaviors.In the optimal licensing mechanism it is shown that externalities make patent holders can extract rents from nonacquirers via an entry fee and also ask for high reservation price which leads to low efficiency in dissemination of knowledge.