负债融资与企业投资决策:破产风险视角的互动关系研究

Interaction Relationships of Debt Financing and Corporate Investment:On the View of Bankruptcy Risk

本文以中国上市公司为样本,研究了破产风险视角下负债融资与企业投资之间的动态作用关系。结果发现,在整体上负债融资会通过对破产风险的正向影响负向地作用于企业的投资决策,反过来,投资支出会负向地影响企业的破产风险,从而有利于负债融资的增加。在代理冲突下这种互动关系会产生异化:在低成长情形下,破产风险一方面会导致控股企业过度投资,另一方面会对非控股企业过度投资产生治理效应;由于低成长企业股东或经理过度投资问题,投资不会降低企业破产风险;在高成长情形下,破产风险会导致绝对控股企业投资不足;高成长情形下,只有相对控股企业的投资具有显著的风险抑制效应。

On the view of bankruptcy risk,it analyses interaction relationships of debt financing and corporate investment of Chinese listed companies.The results reveal that,on the whole,debt financing would negatively influence investment through its positive acts on bankruptcy risk,and investment would positively act on debt financing through its negative influences on bankruptcy risk.When there are agency conflicts,the interaction of debt financing and investment would be different： in the firms with low growth,bankruptcy risk would lead controlled firms to over investment,and would also debate managers＇ over-investment in non-controlled firms;due to over-investment problem of low growth firms,investment would not reduce bankruptcy risk;in the firms with high growth,bankruptcy risk would induce equity-holders＇ under-investment in absolute controlled firms;in high growth firms,only investment in relatively controlled firms would lower bankruptcy risk.