期刊文献+

事前技术许可条件下被许可企业自主创新投资决策研究 被引量:3

Research on independent innovation investment decisions of the licensee under ex ante licensing
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摘要 建立包含事后许可的R&D竞争模型,来研究事前被许可企业自主创新投资决策及其价值。研究结果表明企业在被许可之前非侵权性模仿的程度越高,其被许可后对自主创新的均衡投资就越少,但对其自身、消费者和整个社会越有利;事前被许可企业自主创新的成本效率越低,其对自主创新的均衡投资就越少,但这种影响越来越弱,同时其自主创新为自身、消费者和整个社会带来的均衡预期价值也越小。促进国内被许可企业增加R&D投入的合理、有效途径之一是尽量提高技术创新的成本效率。 Independent innovation investment decisions of the ex ante licensee and their value are studied through building a R&D race model which includes ex post licensing. Results show that the higher the level of non - infringing imitation of the ex ante licensee is, the fewer its investments on independent innovation are, but the more itself, consumers and society benefit; the lower the cost efficiency of independent innovation of the ex ante licensee is, the fewer its investments on independent innovation are, but such influence becomes smaller and smaller, and the lower the equilibrium expected value of its independent innovation to itself, consumers and society is. A good way to increase R&D investments of the ex ante licensee is to increase its cost efficiency of innovation.
作者 冯忠垒 陈圻
出处 《科学学研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第3期453-458,共6页 Studies in Science of Science
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(79860007)
关键词 事前许可 被许可企业 自主创新 非侵权性模仿 成本效率 cx ante licensing licensee independent innovation non -infringing imitation cost efficiency
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参考文献20

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同被引文献51

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