摘要
从终极控制人的视角,以我国2002~2006年深市民营上市公司563个观察值为研究对象,实证检验了终极控制股东超额控制、现金流权对公司透明度的影响。研究表明:低的公司信息披露透明度作为终极控制股东隐蔽控制权收益的一个机制,终极控制股东会通过操纵公司透明度来实现自己的利益。与"堑壕效应"相一致,终极控制股东超额控制程度与公司透明度负相关。与"激励效应"相一致,终极控制股东现金流权与公司透明度正相关。
Using a corporate-level dataset of 563 SZSE private listed companies over the period of 2002-2006, This paper examines how the excess control, cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholder influence corporate transparency. The results show: low corporate transparency as the mechanism of ultimate controlling shareholder masking their private benefits of control, they can through manipulating corporate transparency to serve their own benefit. In line with the "entrenchment effect" , the excess control extent of ultimate controlling shareholder is negatively related to corporate transparency. In line with the "incentive effect" , the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholder are positively related to corporate transparency.
出处
《证券市场导报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第3期47-53,共7页
Securities Market Herald
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70672054):"基于终极所有权结构差异的代理问题与融资决策研究"
关键词
终极控制股东
超额控制
现金流权
公司透明度
Ultimate Controlling Shareholder, Excess Control, Cash Flow Rights, Corporate Transparency