摘要
本文设定发生财务危机和经营正常两个对比样本组,经验分析中国上市公司CEO权力对财务危机公司业绩的影响。结果表明,在财务危机组,CEO权力越小,危机越严重;而正常组的CEO权力越大,经营绩效则越好。因此CEO权力大小是公司陷入财务危机的影响因素,且与公司业绩呈正相关关系;而处于不同产业生命周期的财务危机公司,其CEO权力对公司业绩的影响存在着差异,从产业的成长期到衰退期是一个逐步减弱的过程。因此本文认为不能否定CEO适度集权,应当选择约束与激励相结合的策略。
This paper assumes two sample groups, one is the companies with financial crisis and another is a normal companies, to examine the impact of CEO's power on the performance of listed companies in China under financial crisis. The empirical results indicate that CEO's power is an impact factor negatively related to the financial crisis, or positively correlated with the companies' performance; but the impact differs from companies with financial crisis in different stages of industry lifecycle. Finally, the paper concludes that we cannot simply deny the effect of the proper concentrated power of CEO, and the combination of the restraint and incentive mechanism to CEO should be encouraged.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第1期179-193,共15页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
国家自然科学基金创新群体项目(70521001)
教育部博士点基金项目(20050006025)