外生批发价下的两级供应链生产与定价问题

Production and Pricing of Two-echelon Supply Chain under Exogenous Wholesale Price

分析了带2次销售机会的两级供应链生产与销售定价问题。制造商在第1阶段期末根据市场状况以批发价的形式将剩余库存卖给零售商,制造商与零售商之间关系分为一体化与分散化决策两种情形。研究结果表明,在期末产品剩余价值、缺货惩罚成本为零以及市场批发价格外生的条件下,一体化决策使得供应链的整体利润最大;而分散化决策只能在特定的批发价合同下才能使得供应链达到一体化下的结果。分散化决策将导致更少的第2阶段销量,更低的第1阶段销售价格以及制造商的生产量。

The paper analyzes the production and distribution of single-period product with two selling opportunities under two-echelon supply chain. The manufacturer produces items and sells them. And after a time period, she must adjust her selling strategy and makes a decision： if there are remnant products, she would sell them to retailers through wholesale price contract. The results show that, under no considering transactions costs, zero salvage value of product, and no punishing cost of lost sales, the supply coordination can be obtained by the centralized decision between the manufacturer and the retailer, and if selling the items by the retailer, decentralized decision can achieve the supply chain coordination just under specified wholesale price contract.