摘要
通过将基础设施特许权合约看作是一个报酬合约,建立基础设施融资项目的激励与监督博弈模型,并探讨了不同收益预期下投资人行为和政府行为之间的关系,分析了固定投资回报、浮动投资回报以及提成制投资回报等三种基础设施特许权合约的激励有效性以及投资人、政府的最优行为。
Regarding infrastructure concession contract as a reward contract, this paper constructs a game model for the incentive and monitoring of infrastructure financing projects. It discusses the relationship between investor behavior and government behavior for corresponding revenue anticipation, and then it analyzes optimal behaviors of the investor, the government and the effectiveness of such infrastructure concession contract incentives as changeless rate of investment, float rate of investment and shared rate of investment.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第3期76-79,93,共5页
Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70473072
70773091)
关键词
基础设施
项目融资
特许合约
激励与监督
infrastructure
project finance
concession contract
incentive and monitor
