生产成本信息不对称的两级供应链协调研究

Coordinating two-echelon supply chain with asymmetric information of manufacturing cost

信息不对称是供应链效率降低的原因之一.在生产成本信息不对称条件下,主要研究当零售商处于领导者地位时,制造商的谎报行为以及谎报对供应链的绩效的影响.当制造商处于领导者地位时,制造商不会谎报其生产成本;当零售商利用订货量对批发价格具有敏感性作为应对制造商谎报成本的一种可能的应对措施并处于领导者地位时,制造商会谎报其生产成本,谎报导致供应链的效率降低.通过数值分析发现,制造商的最优谎报随市场需求不确定性的增大而降低;随零售商的订货量对制造商的批发价格敏感性系数的增大而增大.

Asymmetric information is one of the causes lowering the efficiency of supply chains. Under the circumstance that the retailer has no knowledge on the manufacturing cost and is the leader of the supply chain, this paper mainly investigates the behaviors of the manufacturer＇ s misreporting, and analyzes impacts of these behaviors on supply chain operation. It is found that the manufacturer will not misreport her manufacturing cost when she is the leader of the supply chain. However, when the retailer is the leader, and he varies his order quantity according to the manufacturer＇ s wholesale price, which is termed as retailer＇ s sensitivity to manufacturer＇ s wholesale price, research results show that the manufacturer will overstate her manufacturing cost, and this misreporting behavior will lower the efficiency of the supply chain. Through numeric analysis, it is found that the degree of the manufacturer＇ s misreporting will be enhanced along with the increase of the retailer＇ s sensitivity, and with decrease of market demand uncertainty.