基于委托-代理下的模糊报童问题

The Fuzzy Newsboy Problem Based on Principal-agent Theory

在委托—代理关系中,代理人的私人信息对委托人的决策会产生重要影响。因此,为了获取代理人的真实信息,设计一个有效的激励机制是委托人的核心问题。本文基于需求依赖于代理人的努力水平和模糊市场条件的假设,利用委托—代理相关理论,探讨了模糊报童问题的激励机制问题。首先讨论了委托人最优产量的确定问题,然后分别给出了可观测和不可观测两种努力水平下的最优激励机制,最后分析了模糊市场条件对委托—代理双方利益的影响。

The agent＇s private information contributes greatly to the principal＇s decision in the relationship of principal-agent. Therefore, it is the key issue for the principal to design an effective incentive mechanism in order to get the true information from the agent. The incentive mechanism about the fuzzy Newsboy problem is studied by using the theory of principal-agent, assuming that the demand is dependent upon the agent＇s effort level and the fuzzy market condition. Firstly, the problem of the principal＇s optimal production is discussed, then the optimal incentive contracts are given respectively based on the observable and dis-observable effort level. Finally, the impact of the fuzzy market condition on the principal and agent＇s profits is analyzed.