期刊文献+

团体规模、动态激励和社会链接对团体贷款影响的实证分析

Empirical Study on Influence of Group Scale,Dynamic Incentive and Social Ties on Group Lending
下载PDF
导出
摘要 本文通过实证分析,考察了团体规模、动态激励、社会链接三个重要因素对团体贷款的影响。结果表明:团体规模对团体贷款效率的影响并不显著,较大的规模更易诱发道德风险,但能降低团体总体风险;动态激励对团体贷款的有效运行具有重要作用;社会链接对团体贷款效率具有重要影响,强的社会链接可以诱致更高但不够稳定的还款意愿。 This paper studies empirically the influences of group scale,dynamic incentive and social ties on group lending. The result shows that:the effect of group scale on group lending is not obvious, and larger group scale may cause more moral hazards but may reduce total risk of group^dynamic incentive is very important for the efficiency of group lending;social ties plays an important role in group lending,and a stronger social tie may lead to a higher but not steady enough repayment willing.
作者 张意如
出处 《技术经济》 2009年第3期81-86,107,共7页 Journal of Technology Economics
关键词 团体规模 动态激励 社会链接 团体贷款 实证研究 group scale dynamic incentive social ties group lending, empirical study
  • 相关文献

参考文献10

  • 1CONLIN M. Peer group micro-lending programs in Canada and the United States[J]. Journal of Development Economics, 1999,60 : 249-269.
  • 2ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION B, MORDUCH J. Microfinance beyond group lending[J]. Economics of Transition, 2000,8 : 401-420.
  • 3IMPAVIDO G. Credit rationing, group lending and optimal group size[J]. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 1998,69 : 243-260.
  • 4ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION B. On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring[J]. Journal of Develop- ment Economics, 1999,60:401-420.
  • 5GACHTER S, FHER E. Collective action as a social exchange[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1999,39 : 341-369.
  • 6WENNER M D. Group credit: a means to improve information transfer and loan repayment performance[J]. Journal of Development Studies, 1995,32 : 263-281.
  • 7张意如.农村与城市:团体贷款适用领域的一个理论研究[J].金融理论与实践,2008(11):36-40. 被引量:1
  • 8MORDUCH J. The microfinance promise[J]. Journal of Economics Literature, 1999,37 : 1569-1614.
  • 9KREPS D M, MILGROM P, ROBERTS J, et al. Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 1982,27 : 245-252.
  • 10MCLNTOSH C, WYDICK B. Competition and microfinance[J]. Journal of Development Economics, 2005,78: 271 -298.

二级参考文献5

  • 1Armendariz De Aghion, Beatriz and Jonathan Morduch (2000): Microfinance beyond group lending, Economics of Transition, 8, 401-420.
  • 2Besley, Timothy and Steven Coate (1995), "Group Lending, Repayment Incentives and Social Collateral," Journal of Development Economics 46:1- 18.
  • 3Conlin , Michael (1999), Peer group microlending programs in Canada and the United States, Journal of Development Economics, 60, 249-269.
  • 4青木昌彦.比较制度分析[M].上海远东出版社,2001
  • 5邹庆,王斌,黄涛,徐涛.联保连心 推动农民走向新联合——对麻城市农村信用社推广农户联保贷款的调查[J].农村经济与科技,2003,14(5):11-13. 被引量:1

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部