密码电路防差分功耗攻击的晶体管级解决方案

Solution of Cryptographic Circuit Based on Transistor Level against DPA Attacks

密码算法被硬件实现时会泄露一些旁路信息,如功耗等。差分功耗分析(DPA)就是利用功耗进行攻击的、最有效的旁路攻击方法。目前有很多的防DPA方法都是基于算法级的,都要改变原来的加密算法。本文提出一种新的防止DPA的方法,通过增加一个晶体管级电路控制功耗,不改变原来的加密算法,但是能有效地防御DPA攻击。

The hardware implementation of cryptographic algorithms may leak many side-channel information, as power consumption etc. The Difference Power Analysis （DPA） is the most efficient side-channel attack by analysis power consumption. Some algorithmic countermeasures have been proposed, but most of them rely on the modification at the algorithm level. This paper propose a novel methyl against DPA, by adding an transistor level circuit to control power consumption, without any algorithmic modification., making a DPA attack a very difficult task.