论我国国有公司监事会的职能重塑与制度优化

On Reshaping Functions and Optimizing Systems of Board of Supervisors in State-Owned Companies

我国国有公司监事会制度经过了三个演化阶段,其制度优势明显。但在实践运作中出现的职权抽象,权、责不协调,权、能不协调等问题使得监事会的监督出现失效,这既需要强化理论底蕴,克服路径依赖,构建配套制度,又需要借鉴国外监事会制度的经验,进行监事会的职能重塑与制度优化,确保国有公司在国有资产保值增值以及国家宏观调控上功能的实现。

The system of board of supervisors in state-owned companies involves three stages of evolution, which has obvious systematic advantages. However, problems in practice such as the abstract terms of reference, lack of coordination between powers and responsibilities, lack of coordination between powers and abilities cause the failure of the board of supervisors, which both need to be strengthened the theory of truth and to overcome the dependence on the path, building a supporting system, and also need to learn from abroad. In order to increase the value of state-owned assets and achieve the macro-control function of China, we should reshape the functions and optimize the systems of the board of supervisors.