两生产商单零售商的货架竞争与协调研究

Research on the Shelf-space Competition and Coordination of Two Manufacturers and One Retailer

研究单个零售商销售两个生产商的品牌产品,其中两种产品完全同质、总需求随机地依赖于总货架展示量。首先由两种产品总需求的分布函数得到每种产品的需求分布函数,然后建立了供应链系统利润最大化、品牌利润最大化和渠道利润最大化下的集中式决策模型。为了协调零售商的分散式决策与集中式决策一致,分别提出了两种回购加线性补贴合同及回购加线性补贴加利润共享合同。最后的算例表明了模型的合理性和协调合同的有效性。

Consider that a single retailer sells two kind of homogeneous products with a shelf-space dependent demand, which are respectively produced by two brand manufacturers. First, the demand distribution function of each product is obtained from the total demand distribution of two products. Second, the centralized decision models are set up for maximizing profits of the whole supply chain system, two brands, the channel consisting of the retailer and one manufacturer, respectively. In order to coordinate retailer＇ s decentralized decisions consistent with the centralized decisions, two buy-back plus linear-subsidy contracts and the boy-back plus linear-subsidy plus profit-share contract are put forward. The final numerical example shows the validity of these models and efficiency of these contracts.