“心”的祛魅——论罗蒂的心理学唯名论

Enchantment of "Mind"——On Rorty's Psychological Nominalism

解构"心"是罗蒂瓦解西方哲学传统的重要一环。罗蒂对"心"进行了详细的概念分析,表明"非空间性"、"意向性"、"现象性"都不足以构成"心"的独特标志。在罗蒂看来,"现象性"或许是传统"心"概念的最重要也最顽固的特征,他把摧毁"心"的现象性本质看作摧毁"心"的关键。为此,他虚构了"对趾人"的思想实验,力图证明,使用现象性语言描述方式不过是一种实践的偶然结果,它和历史文化传统密切相关,和"心"的确立并不相干。罗蒂的结论是,"心"的问题其实是语言问题,心理学语汇不过是多种语汇之一种;使用哪种语汇是社会实践问题,而不是本体论问题。由此,他的基本立场从早期的取消主义转向了塞拉斯所倡导的"心理学唯名论"。

Deconstruction of ＂mind＂ is an important part of Rorty＇s strategy of destroying Western philosophical tradition. By a detailed conceptual analysis of ＂mind＂, Rorty makes it clear that ＂nonspatial＂, ＂intentional＂ and ＂phenomenal＂ cannot be taken as the marks of ＂mind＂. In Rorty＇s eyes, ＂phenomenal＂ could be regarded as the most important characteristic of ＂mind＂, he takes the destruction of the relationship between ＂phenomenal＂ and ＂mind＂ as the key to dissolve ＂mind＂. Rorty designs a thinking experiment of ＂The Antipodeans＂ to display that the phenomenal way is only a contingent result of practice which has nothing to do with ＂mind＂. According to Rorty, ＂mind＂ issue is actually nothing but language issue, psychological vocabulary is only one of many vocabularies; What language is chosen and used by us is not an ontological question but a social practical question.