摘要
研究了在不完全信息的信贷市场中，规避风险厌恶型企业道德危害的信贷决策机制，考察了在该机制中贷款利率、抵押品需求量和信贷配给对规避企业道德危害的作用．提出了这种机制作用下均衡的贷款合同应满足的一些性质．
The credit decision mechanism against moral hazard in a competitive market with imperfect information when entrepreneurs are risk averse is studied in this paper.The roles of interest repayment,collateral and rationing in credit market with imperfect information are analyzed.The properties of credit decision mechanism in equilibrium are presented.
出处
《上海交通大学学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
1998年第3期1-5,共5页
Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University
关键词
信贷决策机制
激励相容性
道德危害
信贷配给
credit decision mechanism
incentive compatibility
moral hazard
credit rationing
